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1. INTRODUCTION
The main purpose of this contribution is to better understand the nature 
of the evolution of the notion of industrial policy since the 1980s. Our 
point of view is twofold. We will first investigate what is the origin of 
that wich was called industrial policy by policy-makers and economists in 
the 1980s and how the term evolved from the 1980s to the present day. We 
will also take into account the main existing theories which have tried 
to explain this real evolution and to understand its conceptual meaning.
Three periods will be made distinct from this perspective. The first corre-
sponds to a period in which industrial policy as such mainly tended to be dis-
carded and replaced by competition policy. In the second period, the major 
concern was the promotion of innovation-based economies; this changed both 
the real contents of industrial policy and the analytical reflection devoted 
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to it. The last period is characterized by a profound revival of industrial pol-
icy and a substantial modification of its contents related to the impact of 
economic structural change. This temporal distinction does not correspond 
however to three entirely different periods including for each one single spe-
cific approach. For instance, the difference or even the opposition between 
industrial and competition policy will be one of the common threads of our 
contribution. The idea that industrial policy can be reduced to competition 
policy or is mainly based on it is more or less present in each of these periods 
even if it is more and more debated. Then, there is no one-to-one correspond-
ence between the periods considered and original analytical approaches. 
Most of the time, different interpretations of industrial policy have tried 
to focus on the same period even if they referred to distinct visions of the 
econo my. Moreover, some concepts, debates or analytical developments are 
present during all the three periods considered. For instance, the discussion 
about the respective merits of markets and state intervention was always 
present and divergent views on industrial policy co-exist, defending various 
approaches. These remarks point out that industrial policy is a complex real-
ity and a polysemous concept which this text will try to clarify.
2. “THE BEST INDUSTRIAL POLICY  
IS NO INDUSTRIAL POLICY”: LIBERAL  
AND NEO-LIBERAL INDUSTRIAL POLICY
“The best industrial policy is no industrial policy” (Aiginger, 2007, pp. 297-
323): this is the main idea which prevailed during the period of the 1980s 
when economic public intervention was discredited and industrial policy 
was substituted by competition policy. In this context characterized by firms 
faced with to a substantial rise of new competitors, subsidies devoted to sup-
port traditional “declining industries” were first considered to be unhelp-
ful to the necessary structural adjustments required by the transforma-
tions of the global world economy. Secondly, industrial policies supporting 
“national champions” endowed with sector-based subsidies were clearly crit-
icized. Quite the reverse, the main idea was to try to reduce public spending 
in three ways: the reduction of subsidies; the privatization of public firms 
out of core state activities and the encouragement of competition at both 
the national and international levels. The term “industrial policy” was less 
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and less used by policy-makers and was often interpreted as a typical exam-
ple of an inefficient form of state intervention. There are two ways of inter-
preting this discredit of industrial policy. The first is as the consequence of 
a liberal conception of the working of a market economy which tried to con-
vince of the benefits of the perfect markets and of the harmful effects of the 
welfare state. The second – related to a neo-liberal conception – introduced 
a different point of view since it accepted the legitimacy of a form of state 
intervention associated with the substitution of industrial by competition 
policy. The period of the 1980s is highly representative of an overall change 
in nature and scale of policy intervention. At the beginning of this decade, 
Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan were elected and favoured deregula-
tion policies while the ex-communist countries began to replace planning 
progressively by markets. Moreover, the substitution of industrial by com-
petition policies also became a general tendency related to globalization. 
Thus, for instance, assistance to development coming from the World Bank 
or the International Monetary Fund became conditioned by liberalization 
in many emerging countries according to what was called the “Washington 
Consensus” (privatization of public firms, policy of opening markets, etc.). 
But it is certainly in the European Union, which was under construction, 
that this principle was applied the most strongly. As Elie Cohen noted, since 
the introduction of the Rome Treaty, “competition policies have a quasi-con-
stitutional status. The Commission defends the interests of the consumer 
while adapting the global movements towards economic liberalization to the 
community space” (Cohen, 2007, p. 221). Mario Monti also stressed the fact 
that the EU is the only economic zone which provides such a form of control 
of state subsidies (Monti, 2009, p. 237). From an international perspective, 
the predominance of competition over industrial policy is also convergent 
with the principles and rules of the World Trade Organization concerning 
trade policies, public subsidies to exports and anti-dumping legislation.
Can all this set of new wave of policies, which emphasis competition above 
all, be qualified as liberal or neo-liberal?
2.1. Is a liberal industrial policy conceivable?
In many respects, there is no real liberal policy. Most of the time, the lib-
eral approach to industrial policy only consists in a criticism of state inter-
vention and the reaction of liberal economists to the industrial policies of 
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the 1970s provides a good instance of this attitude. The origin of this reac-
tion derives from the idea that in a market economy there is no efficient 
form of economic regulation apart from market allocation. The theoretical 
origins of this form of economic liberalism are various. One of them is the 
Austrian economic tradition of the spontaneous order which argues that the 
firm seen as a form of organization, the state or any other type of economic 
institution are unable to equal the market as regards their performances 
in the allocation of scarce resources. According to this economic tradition, 
market competitive mechanisms are information processes which perma-
nently participate in a “discovery procedure” and favour the tendency 
towards an economic equilibrium supporting the prevailing social order. 
Therefore, most of the forms of rigidity generated by forms of organization, 
institutions, state planning or regulation should be eradicated. However, 
the Austrian tradition also considers that competition has to be considered 
in relation to innovation. Now it is perfectly possible that during the dis-
covery procedure entrepreneurs will find possible unexploited opportu-
nities for welfare enhancement that they have ignored until then. These 
opportunities might be associated with transitory monopoly profits related 
to the first phase of entrepreneurial innovation as in Schumpeter’s com-
petition theory. If during this phase public authorities restrict the monop-
oly profits that arise before a monopoly is contested or before innovation 
makes the monopoly irrelevant then they will reduce invention and inno-
vation. This is why according to the Austrian tradition a liberal competi-
tion policy might be less restrictive in some circumstances.
Another analytical foundation is the predominant interpretation of the 
Walrasian-Paretian tradition which emerged in the 20th century, after 
Léon Walras and Vilfredo Pareto and relates market to social optimum. 
The existence of a market General Economic Equilibrium is indeed con-
sidered as the necessary condition for the realization of social welfare. 
For this school of economic thought, production, intertemporal exchange 
and capital accumulation are indeed nothing more than extended forms 
of competitive exchange. Therefore, they are entirely dominated by a pure 
market-oriented economic logic and we can now understand why accord-
ing to the post-Walrasians the notion of market competition is the core 
of industrial activity and sums up how this activity is actually working. 
In contrast with the Austrian tradition, the Walrasian-Paretian approach 
does not take into account the possible emergence of innovations.
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Therefore in the approaches related to both Austrian and Walrasian-
Paretian traditions, the only possible attitude as regards industrial policy 
of the 1980s is to fight against the state intervention which was emblem-
atic during the golden age years and the predominance of the Welfare 
State even if the ways and means of this fight are not identical in both 
traditions.
What is important to notice here is that, within the empirical liberal 
point of view, very often even the notion of competition policy itself may 
be contested. This policy is supposed to give too much room to standard-
setting action by the state through measures of quality or norm control 
of products for instance especially through anti-trust policy. According 
to this view, it is better to leave to market private institutions the task 
of market control since they are more efficient than public institutions. 
This task can be given to self-organized professions the purpose of which 
is to make markets more transparent, more efficient and more consist-
ent with free competition mechanisms. These professions include account-
ants, firm consultants, fiscal consultants, firm auditors, financial ana-
lysts, legal advisers, etc.
Therefore, competition policy itself often seems useless for the parti-
sans of this first type of approach. It assumes that market economies are 
essentially self-regulated by free market and free competition principles. 
Any type of institutional or control intervention which does not respect 
these principles can only be analysed as a perturbation of the logic of 
exchange and therefore as a violation of some form of natural or optimal 
order.
2.2. The neo-liberal conception of industrial policy: 
the primacy of competition policy1
Contrary to the precedent approach, another conception stresses the cen-
trality of competition policy as a state policy. The general point of view 
1 This part draws heavily on an OECD report entitled “Competition policy, Industrial Policy 
and National champions” and especially on the analytic note written by David Spector 
which does not concern directly the period we consider here but perfectly uses and 
expresses the economic arguments developed by the “neo-liberal” approach (OECD, 2009).
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defended by this neo-liberal conception consists in considering competition 
policy as the core of industrial policy replacing then the latter by the for-
mer. It also leads to drawing attention to the danger of building and imple-
menting a pure policy supporting “national champions”. Competition pol-
icy is no longer considered to be useless by neo-liberal economists as it was 
the case for a large part of their liberal colleagues. For neo-liberal econo-
mists, the sole purpose is the “maximization of consumer welfare” (OECD, 
2009, p. 11). However, the meaning of this purpose is not identical to its 
Walrasian-Paretian equivalent. The approach here is not the introduction 
of a once-for-all and general rule concerning operation of the market and 
supported indifferently by law, state regulation, competition authorities 
or even private operators. It is the introduction of a consistent public com-
bination of various long-term and permanent political actions of the state 
favouring this purpose. The main arguments used only partially overlap 
the traditional liberal approach: left to itself, the state is not able to obtain 
the adequate information in order to be able to choose which industry or 
sector to support (because of the imperfections of public and centralised 
information or because of market failures for instance); rents generated by 
uncontrolled public support provoke activities of capture and corruption 
(electoral and political motivations replacing the search for economic effi-
ciency); selection of and public support to national champions only chosen 
by political authorities favour distortions related to the size of firms and 
generates market allocative inefficiencies. However, the neo-liberal con-
clusion clearly differs from the liberal one: industrial policy is a necessity 
but should be limited to competition policy since the latter is considered to 
be much more efficient than the former, in order to fight against excessive 
prices while being clearly less expensive.2 Therefore the main foundation 
of competition policy is here a kind of cost-advantage calculation rather 
2 In a more recent context and concerning industrial policies developed by emergent 
countries, the following quotation of the OECD secretary report perfectly charac-
terizes this conception: “In any case, empirical evidence shows that, in a globalised 
world, emerging firms grow better by first competing at home without state support, 
and thus prepare themselves better to compete on international markets. Indeed, 
intense rivalry between firms and the permanent threat to incumbents posed by 
innovative entrants are a far better engine of growth than industrial policies run 
by bureaucrats who are not subject to market discipline, but are capable of being cap-
tured by vested interests. There is also ample evidence of the failure of many national 
champions, which can often be ascribed to a lack of accountability, and to economi-
cally irrational decisions resulting from politicised governance” (OECD, 2009, p. 16).
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than the idea of the immediate and absolute establishing of an optimal eco-
nomic equilibrium, ideal or natural. Using the former foundation neo-lib-
eral arguments consist of showing that competition policy and its related 
political and/or legal actions (market regulation and control of mergers) 
can in fact help to better realize the objectives of industrial policy: ration-
alizing production; fighting against “excessive prices”; developing new sec-
tors, new firms, new goods produced by incoming firms; stimulating pro-
ductive and allocative efficiency related to rivalry on contestable markets, 
etc. (Spector, 2009, p. 41). When competition policy is compared to a pol-
icy of national champions, three types of positive effects are noticed as 
regards economic performances: “the realization of economies to scale” 
which essentially results from the pressure of market mechanisms and 
from the concentration and the rationalization it generates (ibid.); “the 
limitation or excessive prices by foreign monopolists” thanks to the cre-
ation of positive transnational externalities (ibid., pp. 42-43) and “meas-
ures facilitating entry in new sectors and firm efficiency” (ibid., pp. 43-45). 
However, in practice, competition law regulates competition policy and if 
theoretical debates in economics have made more complex the very defini-
tion of competition and sometimes influenced the legislator, what finally 
remains is that “maximizing consumer welfare is the only economically 
legitimate goal of antitrust policy” (Brock and Obbst, 2009, p. 67) while 
however this maximal welfare remains a long term purpose which should 
be built little by little and permanently. Those principles underpin com-
petition policy.
2.3. The neo-liberal conception of industrial policy: 
universality and context-independence
If industrial policy includes other measures than those of competition pol-
icy, it must be compatible with the latter. If this condition is satisfied, it 
also consists of specific purposes such as the improvement of the compet-
itiveness of national industry, the increase of knowledge and the intensi-
fication of the innovation necessary for achieving it. But these purposes 
must necessarily be compatible with competition policy and “respectful of 
sound competition principles” (OECD, 2009, p. 12). The central role attrib-
uted to competition policy must always be maintained whichever is the 
macroeconomic context which prevails and the sector considered, as the 
following quotation confirms:
INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS AND POLICY
REVUE D ’ÉCONOMIE INDUSTRIELLE ➻  N° 154  ➻  2 E TR IMESTRE 201640
“The importance both of the free market and of the protective role of the 
competition authorities as regards the free market should prevail, even in 
times of severe economic crisis. In fact, in turbulent times, competition 
itself can play a considerable role in helping to steady economic nerves; 
competition law and policy, as instruments that protect competition, 
are therefore of significant value. It is axiomatic that political concerns 
are capable of influencing proposed solutions to a given economic crisis. 
Consequently, such solutions may be formulated in a manner that does 
not respect the pro-competitive principles of the free market. At all times 
though, policy makers should recognise the fact that robust competition 
policy is essential in order to prevent long-run harm to the global econ-
omy in the period following the stabilisation of economic conditions. In 
dealing with the current crisis one must ensure that competition law and 
policy continue to apply to, and to be respected in, all sectors of the econ-
omy, including the financial sector” (OECD, 2009, p. 12).
This quotation is especially significant. It points out the central impor-
tance and permanence of the principles which support competition policy 
within the neo-liberal approach.
On one hand, competition reinforcement is perfectly independent of the 
macroeconomic context in which the national or the global economy is 
developing. Obviously, this point of view can only be conceived if one 
assumes that the microeconomic working of market economies is not 
influenced at all by its macroeconomic context. It therefore implies that 
the macroeconomic state of the economy is only the aggregate result of 
micro-decisions and that it only depends on these decisions. Some form 
of logical consistency is thus respected even if the price to pay is high: 
the only relation between the micro- and the macro-economic levels is 
aggregation; therefore, the macro-decisions of the state or of international 
institutions or organizations cannot influence the microeconomic work-
ing of national and global economies, except as a form of distortion or 
imperfection as regards social welfare. In this context, competition pre-
cisely appears to be a positive means to avoid this form of distortion or 
imperfection. To a large extent, this conception is not contradictory with 
the Walrasian/Paretian view of the economic system. Game theory is 
more difficult to combine with it since international relations can work 
with strategic public interactions differently from those of internal firms 
(Arena and Dutraive, 2016, pp. 18-19).
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On the other hand, it is assumed that competition policy must be applied 
in the same way to all economic industries. No exception is conceivable. 
This point of view excludes any form of sectoral specificity and implies 
that the institutional (type of market auction, form of organization of 
buyers and sellers, nature of intermediaries between supply and demand, 
degree of price flexibility, role of social norms on the market...) and pro-
ductive (type of product, materiality of product, form of trading, form of 
returns, prevailing techniques...) characteristics of the market are them-
selves not influenced by competition policy since its effects are assumed 
to be uniform in all the markets of the economy. Again this view is not 
incompatible with a Walrasian/Paretian conception while it is less com-
patible with the Austrian one (because of the differentiated role of inno-
vation in this analytical framework) and is entirely incompatible with the 
foundations of game theory which always stress the importance of secto-
ral differences (Arena and Dutraive, 2016, pp. 12-14).
From this perspective, the very notion of “industry” or of “sector” loses 
any meaning and it becomes impossible to conceive a sectoral or a mac-
roeconomic dynamics where economic structural change prevails. This 
view is also contradictory to evolutionary approaches to industrial policy. 
This neo-liberal approach implies therefore a vision of industrial dynam-
ics heavily rooted in a conception of the economy where steady states pro-
vide the benchmark of economic systems and economic disequilibria are 
seen as linear and provisional perturbations. The notions of vertical inte-
grated sectors, production chains or networks are also difficult to define 
and use in this context which underestimates interdependence effects at 
the national or the global level. Specific, sectoral or industrial market fail-
ures are also excluded and therefore the possibility of sectoral state sub-
sidies is not rejected, these subsidies are necessarily limited, transitional 
and supposed to disappear in the long run.
Solutions provided by competition policy are therefore universal, namely, 
independent from time and geography. They pave the only possible way 
to follow. In this context, the meaning of globalization only refers to the 
context of a competition policy extended to the world economy. In a nut-
shell, the originality of the neo-liberal approach compared to the liberal 
one consists of the defence of an active and permanent competition pol-
icy (or an industrial policy based on competition policy) attributing to 
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the state the unique role of restoring competition. Therefore, neo-liberal 
approaches are not purely critical concerning public regulation as are lib-
eral approaches regarding the notion of industrial policy. We will see how-
ever that the growing space empirically attributed at the end of the 1980s 
and in the 1990s to technological change and to financial globalization, 
and to the decrease of the importance attributed to the specificities of eco-
nomic has obliged the neo-liberal approach to change and shift to new 
concepts in order to continue to exert an essential intellectual influence 
until the present days.
3. THE NEW “HOLY GRAIL” OF INDUSTRIAL 
POLICY IN THE 1990S AND THE BEGINNING 
OF 2000S: INNOVATION, CLUSTERS, AND 
COMPETITIVENESS
The purpose of the second part of this paper is to provide an analyti-
cal interpretation of the changes which affected the contents of North 
American and European industrial policies during the 1990s and the 
beginning of 2000s. During this period, the revival of industrial policy 
led to the restoration of active state intervention, sectoral policies and 
national champions support which a majority of policy-makers and econo-
mists preferred not to make use of in the previous period. However, com-
petition policy did not disappear even if it had to adapt to a new context 
and a new agenda for economic policy. One of the major specificities of the 
period – reflected in Europe by the Lisbon Agenda for instance – indeed 
consisted of promoting the building of a new “knowledge-based economy” 
rather than a “manufacturing renaissance”. The 1990s were the decade of 
major technical and technological changes which had crucial repercus-
sions on the world economic structure. The USA and Japan, the main com-
petitors in technological leadership, both illustrate an effective policy of 
support for high technology industries since the 1950s and 1960s3 differ-
ing from the usual conception of competition policy. The United States 
massively financed the research and development of companies thanks 
to various agencies related to the military and civil sectors. The Japanese 
3 See Mazzucato (2013) for the major influence of state “entrepreneurship” in USA 
economy and the mythology of a pure market economy.
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government attributed very important grants to the university research. 
It played an essential role of coordinator and prospector, especially 
through its focus on the innovative activities of companies. Moreover, the 
American strategy especially became a model for high-income countries 
and the link between knowledge-oriented activities and economic growth 
became a predominant and recurrent theme. This is why it can be said 
that in this period, “industrial policy is merging more and more with 
innovation policy” (Soete, 2007, p. 273).
In connection with this new context, the nature of industrial policy and 
its economic justifications significantly evolved in comparison with pre-
vious periods.
3.1. Innovation policy: nature of interventions  
and theoretical justifications
The public support of innovation therefore became the new credo of eco-
nomic policy. In this context, the new spirit of public intervention is to 
avoid the fallacies of “sectoral and vertical industrial policies” of the 1960s 
and 1970s and first promote “horizontal” policies, namely to act on the 
microeconomic and legal environment of companies in order to reinforce 
its compatibility with competition policy. Therefore, strictly liberal poli-
cies were definitively abandoned. To a large extent, neo-liberal competition 
policies continued to prevail even if their contents substantially changed, 
becoming more and more different from the Walrasian/Paretian intel-
lectual framework. They were more and more influenced by game theory 
(Arena and Dutraive, 2016, pp. 14-16) and evolutionary theory for two main 
reasons. It became first impossible to continue to defend the point of view 
of a unique and universal context developed in the preceding section. They 
could not persist in ignoring the necessity to take into account the new 
institutional and geopolitical specificities of a form of globalization where 
international competitiveness and an intense race towards innovation 
were now prevailing. Moreover horizontal policies implied enlarging the 
set of the political actions of the state in favour of specific companies which 
had to be stimulated in order to generate more and more innovations.
The prevalent idea became the necessity of helping to build a new “knowl-
edge-based economy” and to organize public action around three main 
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domains: education, upstream and downstream factors of innovation – the 
financial conditions of research and intellectual property rights laws – and 
high-technology sectors. In the first of these domains, the objective was to 
improve labor productivity, adaptability and mobility of the workforce in 
order to fit with the new economic context of international competition. 
Thus world indicators devoted to the comparison of national educative 
systems (such as the Program for International Student Assessment – 
PISA, Academic Ranking of World Universities – Shanghai Ranking) were 
introduced to favor the normalization and geographic mobility of the 
labour force. Concerning the second domain, various political tools were 
mobilized to sustain research and development by direct subsidies, stimu-
lative fiscal policy and financial market regulation on the one hand, and 
by a development of the sphere of intellectual property rights (to boost 
the possibility of appropriation of research results) and reforms in pub-
lic research systems (to move it closer to the market by patenting and 
public-private cooperation) on the other hand. The idea was to allocate 
public funds to small and medium rather than to large firms “reflecting 
the view that industrial policy should rather focus on the development of 
small innovative companies. This view can be traced back to Schumpeter’s 
idea that growth is a process of creative destruction in which new firms 
displace older incumbents, so that a sound industrial policy should foster 
the development of small, innovative firms rather than help incumbents” 
(OECD, 2009, p. 32). Major attention was paid to the generic high-technol-
ogies and especially to information and communication technologies and 
biotechnologies because of their supposed structural effects on economy 
taken as a whole (especially on new sectors, new products and markets but 
also on the productivity in all other economic sectors) in agreement with 
the prevalence of horizontal policies.
Two major analytical foundations were used to explain the introduc-
tion of this new type of industrial policy, leading to a much more eclec-
tic approach: market failures and welfare economics literature strongly 
supported by the advances of game theory (Arena and Dutraive, 2016, 
pp. 14-18) on the one hand and evolutionary economics on the other hand. 
Market failures and welfare economics literature developed what was ini-
tially called “the new industrial economics” (see for instance Jacquemin, 
1987; Tirole, 1988). In the 1990's, this literature provided precisely 
some arguments for public intervention in order to foster innovation 
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(Dobrinski, 2009, p. 284). According to this literature, private companies 
cannot indeed appropriate some of their expected returns. Industrial 
activity is associated to externalities which make, at least in the short 
term, activities implemented by private companies and indirectly 
financed by private equity and financial markets risky. Externalities are 
not intrinsically related to activities based on research and development 
and knowledge. However, these activities are among those which tend to 
increase the most the level of risk since they permanently generate exter-
nalities which are especially hard to avoid. Legal means such as patents 
or licenses provide in this context a means to put these externalities in 
contradiction with the old strict Walrasian-Paretian framework; more-
over, competition including these means allows a form of externalities 
distribution among firms through imperfect competition mechanisms 
which can be retraced through standard as well as dynamic game the-
ory (Arena and Dutraive, 2016). Sometimes, if some forms of knowledge 
generate too large increasing returns or externalities in spite of legal 
devices, the state must intervene as is the case for instance in the field 
of fundamental research (Encaoua and Guesnerie, 2006). Therefore, the 
game theory literature on market failures and welfare economics contrib-
uted the questionning of traditional competition policies in showing that 
new technologies and especially information and communication tech-
nologies create externalities which in fact increase the variety of market 
failures and of the cases in which social welfare is not reached. It there-
fore paved the way to a new industrial policy attributing a larger role 
to legal means of reducing externalities and to state intervention when 
markets become inefficient, in connection with what was observed in the 
real economic world of the 1990s.
Evolutionary economics also provided a set of tools which could help to 
take seriously into account the role of innovation and knowledge as fac-
tors of growth in a dynamic perspective. Based on the various influ-
ences of Neo-Schumpeterian ideas (Arena, 2016), the initial purpose of 
evolutionary economics was to offer an alternative theory of the firm 
and of competition by overtaking difficulties associated with “sub-
stantive rationality”, production functions and traditional microeco-
nomics. This approach focused on the notion of selection in competi-
tive processes, introducing variety, adaptation, and learning behavior 
in a dynamic economic framework. Within this framework, economic 
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growth is conceptualized as a co evolution process of social and techno-
logical technologies. In so called Neo-Schumpeterian’s models (Metcalfe, 
1998), “the traditional view of linear innovation models (from research 
to technology to commercial product) has given way to the now dom-
inating view that innovation results from simultaneous interactions 
of many agents interconnected in a complex system” (Dobrinski, 2009, 
p. 281). Because the economic mechanisms and dynamics bound to these 
factors are complex and multiple (see for instance Saviotti, 1995 part II) 
and consequently imperfectly manageable, the lessons for a public indus-
trial policy are not so easy to be drawn. However, a strong message of 
evolutionary models is the conclusion that market processes are not 
always efficient, as the defenders of competition policy tend to argue. 
Therefore the defense of an horizontal competition policy is difficult to 
support using a Neo-Schumpeterian approach which is influential to-
day at least in Europe and where sectoral specificities play an essential 
role. Thus, even if market failure and welfare economics literature as 
well as evolutionary economics tried to provide new tools to understand 
the industrial policies of the 1990s and the beginning of the 2000s, it 
is obvious that these two approaches strongly differ from an analytical 
point of view. This remark shows that far from inspiring industrial pol-
icy, economic theories rather provide tools which can be used by policy-
makers to justify or explain their own conceptions. This is why policy-
makers do not exclude making use of different approaches, even if they 
are based on distinct analytical foundations.
3.2. A new form of organization of economic 
activities: regional cluster agglomerations
As the preceding section stressed, innovation-based activities are much 
too complex to be only and always managed by market processes and some 
new institutional and organizational forms therefore emerged which are 
connected to the localization of activities. The forms of this localization 
are various and generated a vast literature which distinguished a typol-
ogy of geographical areas in relation to the kind of innovation they pro-
moted, the kind of industrial organization they created, their degree of 
insertion in the international economic system or the role of the state in 
the constitution of the cluster. Because of the emergence of these agglom-
erations, national economies are less and less considered as the core of the 
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geographical organization of activities. This is why delimited territories or 
areas more and more became the targets of new policies.
The economic arguments used to support a decentralized approach of 
industrial policy focusing on “clusters” can be found in the developments 
of new research areas such as evolutionary economics and new geograph-
ical economics. These two fields and the approaches they generated share 
the idea that price dynamics is not only affected by variable costs, as 
in traditional microeconomics, but also by fixed costs of varied nature, 
which entailed Marshallian increasing returns. Proximity and geograph-
ical agglomeration favor territorial external economies of scale – based 
on the sharing of inputs and the constitution of labor pools – compatible 
with a combination of competition and of inter-firm cooperation at dif-
ferent stages of the process. Proximity also favors learning and spillover 
effects bound to industrial and market linkages which provide the intan-
gible assets of innovation.
All the economic properties, first grounded in Marshall and Beccatini’s 
analyses of industrial districts or Porter’s “clusters”, and updated in evo-
lutionary or new geographic models have in common their connection 
with “dynamic market failures” (increasing returns, locking effects and 
polarization phenomena) in opposition to “static market failures” (size 
of the market, size of the firm) as in the previous models of competition 
policy. Therefore, industrial policy has to favor these positive dynamic 
effects. This is the reason why “industrial policy then not only internal-
izes externalities, but also produces externalities” (Aiginer, 2007, p. 314). 
Secondly models also tend to show that the “success” is uncertain, based 
on finally unpredictable and unverifiable micro-phenomena (sometimes 
explained by historical events). These difficulties generated some debates 
concerning the capacity to influence economic agglomeration and the 
issue of the respective room to leave to market and state. These debates 
did not lead to definitive conclusions and it is not clear to-day to what 
extent competition policy is able to contribute to the industrial efficiency 
of these agglomerations. This temporary conclusion introduced more 
uncertainty regarding the credibility of competition policies confronted 
by the rise of these new phenomena. Even more, a purely horizontal com-
petition policy cannot easily be conceivable to favour the development of 
specified clusters.
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3.3. Competitiveness and the international dispersion 
of productive processes
At the same time, besides this trend towards regional agglomeration an 
opposite trend of production fragmentation emerged and could also be 
observed in the 1990s. The globalization of the productive process by trans-
national companies rose in parallel to the rise of the share of exports in the 
World Growth National Product. In other words, the tendencies towards 
supranational and regional level of activities overlapped. The rise of globali-
zation of production and offshoring was clearly the outcome of a combina-
tion of political factors, which widened the opportunities for foreign direct 
investments (China’s opening, fall of the Berlin Wall), of technological fac-
tors (which reduced information cost and favored fragmentation of the 
value chains) and of specific economic factors (market deregulation policies 
in trade and finance). Within this new context the notion of competition 
was more and more replaced by the notion of competitiveness. According to 
Bailey-Driffield (Bailey-Driffield, 2007, p. 193), in the last decades this term 
“has become the holy grail of industrial policy”. Popularized in the politi-
cal sphere by Porter, the concept of competitiveness moved from the anal-
ysis of firm business and management to the study of regions and coun-
tries and transposed explicitly the assessment of countries performances’ 
from the macroeconomic to the microeconomic framework (Aiginger, 2006, 
p. 63). This interpretation contributed to the macroeconomic context to an 
aggregative result and therefore reinforced the usual neo-liberal concep-
tion of competition. Increasing market shares in world exports by reducing 
costs, increasing productivity and fostering innovation became the major 
objective of economic policies. On the other hand, the search for competi-
tiveness also consisted in attracting foreign direct investments (FDI) by fis-
cal means. In this process of attracting FDI, territories, national economic 
regulation and institutions were put into competition. This is why globali-
zation is also a force of policies homogenization. As the World Bank Doing 
Business Ranking explicitly declared: “By gathering and analyzing com-
prehensive quantitative data to compare business regulation environments 
across economies and over time, Doing Business encourages countries to 
compete towards more efficient regulation; offers measurable benchmarks 
for reform; and serves as a resource for academics, journalists, private sec-
tor researchers and others interested in the business climate of each coun-
try” (World Bank Doing Business, 2015).
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The conceptions developed by evolutionary economics and new geograph-
ical economics can be extended to and used in the field of international 
economics. For instance, evolutionary economics can help to explain phe-
nomena such as the polarization of FDI in research and development, the 
success or failure of some offshoring experiments taking into account 
the importance of tacit knowledge and the proximity of economic activi-
ties. New economic geography can encompass integration and dispersion 
effects of economic activity at the world level.
Concerning globalization, economists – especially new institutional eco-
nomics and new international economics – and policy-makers also took into 
account the increasingly central role played in the period by market insti-
tutions. Here again, this new form of globalization changed substantially 
the contents of economic policy. On one hand, the most partisans of com-
petition policy found a way to cope with these new international phenom-
ena by extending the notion of social optimum at the international level. 
They considered that there was only one optimal environment for busi-
ness, market and competition, and therefore that the reduction of obstacles 
to business4 and to international trade and investment was now the only 
admissible policy. On the other hand, an increasing number of economists 
expressed doubts about the existence of optimal institutions and consid-
ered there was a room to analyze the state as a game player. These econo-
mists therefore argue that instead of defending a unique extended compe-
tition policy it is better to favour a form of public intervention defined as a 
“strategic commercial policy” (consisting in a renewal of the infant indus-
try arguments) or active industrial policy, which implies that there is no 
“one best way” but some space for a range of diversity among institutional 
designs according to the various national histories and trajectories (see for 
instance Krugman and Obstfeld, 2009; Rodrick, 2009 or Amable, 2005). 
This second conception was rightly interpreted as a new element of neo-
liberal misconceptions and contributed to the weakening of its promotors.
In the field of innovation, comparative studies concerning national sys-
tems of innovation developed by evolutionary economists permitted to the 
4 Like the list provided by WB doing business criteria: reduce time to start a busi-
ness, time to deal with construction permits, time to get electricity, time to regis-
ter a property, time to export, time to enforce contracts, time to hire and fire an 
employee, and  time to resolve insolvency.
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taking into account of national specificities in the bundle of national insti-
tutions related to the strength of globalization as well as the development 
of local clusters or geographical areas. These studies also led assessment 
of whether international competition rather favoured variety or conver-
gence of the systems of innovation and performances across nations. The 
I990s cannot therefore be interpreted as the end of neo-liberal policies but 
we should also avoid to under-estimate during the period the importance 
of the rise of new industrial policies often inspired by evolutionary or neo-
institutionalist economics.
The results of competition policies at the beginning of the 21st century 
are balanced. If the only policy objective is indeed to influence the busi-
ness environment in order to improve competitiveness, effects appear to 
be insufficient to allow all participants to support international compe-
tition and to proceed to structural transformations in a growing back-
ground context of environmental imperative. By continuing to emphasize 
competition through the notion of competitiveness, competition policies 
favoured industrial strategies at an international level which generated 
desindustrialization and the development of strategies of financializa-
tion by the big industrial firms. The specialization in research, services 
and finance which was favored finally appears to be unfit for establish-
ing a balance in the world exchanges (Prodi, 2010; Artus and Virard, 2011; 
Cohen, 2009, pp. 237-250). The competitiveness policies also affected pub-
lic finance. For instance, in the E.U. (27), the average of taxes on corpo-
rate income passed from 35% in 1995 to less than 22% in 2012. The result is 
“that of jurisdictions competing against each other and generating a pris-
oners dilemma; investment is diverted from other locations, but little new 
investment may be created. If all countries use policy there may be lit-
tle net effect on outcomes but considerable transfer of resources to firms” 
(Barba Navarreti and Venable, 2013, p. 8).
The new economic phenomena which emerged in the 1990s and at the 
beginning of the 21st century (generalized innovation, globalization) did 
not imply the end of competition policies. Quite the contrary, they contrib-
uted to enlarge the purpose of these policies including a more extended 
definition of the social optimum target. This enlargement however had 
to face the rise of various new research fields and approaches which were 
not compatible with the objectives of a competition policy. Therefore, in 
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the 1990s and at the beginning of the 21st century, the credibility of this 
policy became less convincing.
However at the end of the 2000s things evolved. The economic effects of 
the subprime mortgage and current economic crisis put at the centerstage 
the “proactive”, sectoral industrial policies (CE, 2012, p. 8) and drew an 
avenue to change substantially the contents of the economic conceptual-
ization of industrial policies.
4. NEW TRENDS IN INDUSTRIAL POLICY: 
STRUCTURAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS
The economic and financial crisis which took place at the end of the 2000s 
and still exerts its effects to-day drastically influenced the world economy 
and especially the economies of the European Union. This crisis renewed the 
interest devoted to manufacturing industry since, as Aiginger noted, indus-
try was and is both characterized by “a statistical decline and [its] main-
tained importance” (Aiginger, 2007, p. 302). In the main developed coun-
tries, the part of industrial jobs and of industrial added value in GDP clearly 
declined durably, a decline accentuated after the subprime crisis, but the 
importance of industry in exports was maintained. Since the 1980s around 
70% of the world trade and 85% of the research and development invest-
ments are still implemented in the industrial sectors. Moreover, the effects 
of industry on firm services and the number of indirect jobs related to 
them grew and the importance of hybridization of industry and services (as 
regards products as well as productive organization) increased drastically. 
This is why, according to a report of the European Commission, “to a large 
extent industry can help rescue the EU economy from the crisis” (CE, 2012, 
p. 32), the new objective being to re-industrialize the European economy 
with the ambition of reaching 20% for the part of industry in the European 
GDP about 2020 (from 16% in the average to-day and 11-12% for older indus-
trial economies like UK or France) (ibid.).
This renewal of industrial policy accelerated the previous tendencies 
which prevailed till the beginning of the 2000s. Competition policy was 
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no longer the unique and central form of industrial policy. On one hand, 
its characterization changed drastically trying to incorporate new ele-
ments such as generalized innovation. On the other hand, it was more 
and more contradicted by new approaches which were trying to take eco-
nomic structural change into account.
4.1. Economic structural change in the 2000s:  
new borders in industry and firms
The financial crisis revealed the danger of a global economic strategy of spe-
cialization mainly based on the development of finance, research and devel-
opment and services. The innovation policies focus – often coupled with a 
rise of financialization – was finally deceptive. In fact, between 2000 and 
2004, the American growth was weaker in the information and communi-
cation technologies sectors than in the other sectors (Kohler, 2006, p. 102). 
The innovative sector corresponded to only 0,4% of the US added value and 
the sector of semi-conductors represented about 0,5% of employment in 
developed countries (McKinsey Global Institute, 2010). Some type of special-
ization weakened economies and made them sensitive to external shocks. 
For instance, in contrast with UK and France, some economies like those 
of Germany and Japan were able to preserve intermediary manufacturing 
activities which permitted them to participate in the new international 
division of productive processes in a more advantageous way. On the con-
trary Greece and Spain were much more affected by the “sovereign debt cri-
sis”: their growth was essentially based on domestic services and construc-
tion industry, and their energy and manufacturing goods imports could not 
be compensated for by tradable services surplus (Artus and Virard, 2011). 
Moreover, innovation is not sustainable without  strong industrial produc-
tion support since we know to-day that both activities are always strongly 
connected. As a consequence “external constraints are back and imply the 
return of the imperative of re-industrialization” (CAE, 2011, p. 46).
But this re-industrialization has to be put in perspective with the eco-
nomic structural change that occurred, and played and is still playing 
an essential role in the debates related to industrial economics and pol-
icy. Economists as different as Fontagné, Mohen, Wolff (2014), Naudé 
(2010a, 2010b) and Rodrik (2007) recently resituated the notion of struc-
tural change in an historical perspective. For these authors, it is clear 
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that economic growth also implies in the long run a “fundamental pro-
cess of structural transformation” (Naudé, 2010a, p. 1). This process con-
cerns the sectoral evolution of technology, the relations between different 
sectors of the economy and the implication for consumption and income 
as the theorists of structural economic change (Baumol, Chenery, Syrquin, 
Pasinetti...) showed a long time ago in the 1960s and still stress nowadays.5 
It naturally generates debates “on the sources of total factor productivity 
(TFP) growth, the extent and determinants of convergence in per capita 
incomes, the nature of technological progress and innovation, the role of 
manufacturing in growth and development, the rise of the service sector 
in value added, of agglomeration, clustering and urbanization, and other 
issues” (Naudé, 2010a, p. 2).
From this perspective, the novelty of contemporary structural change is 
first related to the relation between industry and services. During the 
Golden Age decades, we all know that the part of agriculture decreased 
in the growth domestic product of developed countries, first in favour 
of industry and then more and more in favour of the sector of services. 
However, in the last two decades, the border between services and indus-
try has become less and less distinct. First, new technologies such as infor-
mation and communication technologies reinforced substantially the 
importance of the intermediary sector of industrial services which con-
tributed to confuse the border. Second, an increasing number of indus-
trial firms are classified within the service sector but their activity in this 
sector is generated by the subdivision of the industrial value chain at the 
international level (Fontagné, Mohen and Wolff, 2014, p. 1). This redefini-
tion of the border between industry and services has important effects on 
the relationship between firms, services and industry, creating new activ-
ities in which some firms or parts of firms tend to specialize in production 
which are not material but contribute to industry, as “factoryless goods 
producers” (Fontagné, Mohen and Wolff, 2014, p. 2). This new type of eco-
nomic structural change also appears at the “local” level with the emer-
gence and the evolution of clusters and therefore of inter-firm relations 
favoured by new forms of state intervention and of industrial financing 
(especially through new types of public subsidies and of venture capital): 
5 For an appraisal of the analytical contributions of the theories of economic struc-
tural change, see Arena and Porta, eds. (2012). See also the introduction of the spe-
cial issue, Dutraive (2016).
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the borders between firms are here transformed, pointing out another 
crucial aspect of economic structural change.
All these transformations obviously imply a new industrial policy. First, it 
is necessary to correct what appear to be ex post misleading strategies in 
the domain of industrial policy (Andreoni and Gregory, 2013). The exces-
sive decline of some industrial sectors in some developed countries has 
led to a loss of knowledge and capabilities which will not be restored eas-
ily. Industrial policy will therefore be useful to a re-orientation of struc-
tural change in order to strengthen specific knowledge-intensive sec-
tors, areas of economic activities, regions, clusters, technologies and even 
industrial services, especially in new types of economic activity. Second, 
during the financial market crisis, the difficulties met by banks and the 
emerging economic recession led many banks to reduce their lending to 
firms in order to repair their impaired balance sheets. The main conse-
quence is that debt financing has become more expensive and difficult 
to obtain, so has financing through capital markets. Risk capital financ-
ing was also reduced substantially. The effects of the financial crisis on 
financing still remain significant in many developed countries since 
the industrial sectors which are strongly impacted are precisely those in 
which knowledge-based and high-technology investments are important 
and costly. Industrial policy answers to this problem are a great challenge 
and related to the role of state in financing mechanisms: it is necessary to 
stop a mechanism in which innovative firms cannot invest what will be 
necessary to promote economic growth and long-term investment.
Here, the novelty is not only related to the fact that the old opposition 
between horizontal and vertical policies is less and less meaningful but can 
also be found in the increasing difficulty in this context to reduce indus-
trial policy to competition policy: this latter type of policy is indeed inade-
quate to bring answers to the challenge implied by a new form of structural 
change. The new paradigm of industrial policy is less systematic and dog-
matic than before and more and more pragmatic and adapted to the con-
texts. For instance, even before the crisis outbreak, in a report dated 2005, 
the European Union defended a specific “matrix approach” combining hor-
izontal policies aiming at improving competitiveness in all sectors in terms 
of broad measure (generic and independent from market specificities; con-
tributing to the elimination of market failures; favouring endogenous 
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growth...) and sectoral policies that acknowledge sector differences neces-
sitating specific measures (Aiginger, 2007; O’Sullivan, Andreoni, López-
Gómez and Gregory, 2013). Mac Kinsey reports (2010, 2012) also considered 
that public policies could not provide identical solutions for the whole vari-
ety of sectors and argued that distinctions had to be made between “trad-
able sectors” corresponding to globalized oligopolistic markets and “non 
tradable” ones being related to domestic ones: the basic idea is that it is dif-
ficult for public authorities to control tradable sectors while it is easier to 
control the latter. Moreover, Kinsey defined industry in an extensive way 
(including trade and services) and considered that employment is created 
in majority in domestic and local services rather than in high technolog-
ical sectors. Obviously the contents of industrial policies must take these 
distinctions into account and therefore face a differentiated international 
structural change which has outdated competition policies.
4.2. New analytical developments in industrial policy 
in the 2000s
In order to better understand the nature of the economic structural changes 
which are impacting economies at local, national and international levels, 
economic theories had to adapt and provide new developments.
Even if it is not really new, the literature on market failures and welfare 
economics tried to renew its contents and message taking into account new 
phenomena related to economic structural change. First it combined micro-
economic analysis and more macroeconomic tools related to the theories of 
economic endogenous growth. An interesting example of this analytical ten-
dency is given by the contribution of Elie Cohen to the Round-Table of the OECD 
that we have already referred to (Cohen, 2009). E. Cohen notes that some usual 
assertions concerning the supposed inferiority of state regulation as regards 
economic efficiency are debatable (Cohen, 2009, p. 226). Now for E. Cohen as 
for new industrial microeconomics, both markets and the state can fail to find 
an efficient allocation, as the financial crisis of the end of the 2000s and its 
financial market failures showed. Finally, E. Cohen contested the idea of the 
universal superiority of competition, “some forms of competition implying 
a negative impact on innovation” (ibid.). Aghion and his co-authors (Aghion, 
Dewatripont, Du, Harrison and Legros, 2012; Aghion, Boulanger and Cohen, 
2011) also combined micro and macroeconomic tools to show that it was to-day 
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useless to have “existential” debates on the advisability of industrial policy vs. 
competition policy. Their point of view is that industrial policy must precisely 
target the sectors where competition and innovation were crucial and define 
therefore an industrial policy which favoured welfare, avoided market fail-
ures but also contributed to global endogenous growth.
Second, the literature on market failures and economic welfare also 
focused on the problems related to new markets, the creation of which 
was not spontaneous but submitted to the regulation of (national, inter-
national or local) public authorities as it is the case for instance in the 
“green” economy with the markets of licenses to pollute or carbon taxes; 
these markets being not only governed by the objectives of self-interest but 
also by the purpose of public interest, and the conciliation of these objec-
tives requires in its turn the use of the theory of market failures as well 
as of public economics to cope with the essential presence of substantial 
externalities. The literature on market failures and economic welfare was 
also used to cope with research and development and knowledge based 
activities. Here again, externalities are at the center of knowledge mar-
kets; the first are monetary externalities related to the increase of quasi-
rents or of the amount of sales in a sector generated by the research and 
development expenses in another sector (see the mechanisms of inter-sec-
toral diffusion of new technologies); the second are knowledge externali-
ties generated by knowledge itself, characterized as a social good (see for 
instance the case of science-related industries and how the bio-techno-
logical paradigm replaced the chemical paradigm in the pharmaceutical 
industry). The knowledge externalities mentioned above cannot be coped 
with through market mechanisms. These mechanisms have to be com-
pleted through state intervention: innovation subsidies, incentives to cre-
ate technological areas or public purchase contracts provide tools to com-
plete possible failures which cannot be avoided in a pure market economy.
Third, coordination failures provided a further analytical field to explain 
some aspects of economic structural change. Thus, for instance, the notion 
of cluster provides a good example of these possible failures which indus-
trial policy can help to avoid. In this context, the analytical task of the 
literature on market failures and economic welfare is to look for a charac-
terization of the best possible coordination of firms and economic activi-
ties in a given geographical space (Fontagné, Mohen and Wolff, 2014, p. 8). 
Finally, public authorities can play an essential role when mergers and 
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acquisitions are realized at the international level; firms are not able to 
assess what national welfare is and the state can again give its help to 
contribute to evaluate and then contribute to favour this welfare (ibid.). 
Finally, this assessment of welfare by the state is also useful to try to 
ensure international competitiveness since this notion does not only con-
cern firms but nations (Aiginger, 2006, p. 122).
In spite of these advances, substantial limits however remain when one 
looks for the foundations of a new industrial policy using the literature 
on market failures and economic welfare. This literature has the merit of 
replacing the opposition between perfect and imperfect competition by a 
continuum of possible forms of economic coordination including various 
types of imperfect competition but also inter-firm coordination schemes 
and differentiated state interventions (Arena and Dutraive, 2016). This 
continuum allows industrial policy to be approached in relation to all the 
possible specific cases. This point of view may appear to conciliate analyt-
ical rigour and realism. However, as Gabszewicz et Thisse (1999) already 
noted a long time ago this continuum provides a patchy set of models the 
global consistency of which is far to be obvious and which is neither robust 
nor generalizable. Finally, economic structural change is not analysed as 
such in this literature but only through its effects on economic coordina-
tion.
In comparison, evolutionary economics which seek to understand the 
logic of industrial dynamics is better equipped to study economic struc-
tural change in relation to the sectorial specificities and interactions. One 
example is provided by Malerba (2007) in which in a “history-friendly” 
framework, economic dynamics is related to the diverse industries. We 
can also refer to a paper of Castellaci (2007) which relates technological 
regimes and sectoral differences of productivity. These differences depend 
on different conditions of technological appropriability, different levels of 
technological opportunities, various levels of education and capabilities, 
degrees of openness to international competition and firm sizes. Several 
other examples of this type of contribution can be considered. Thus, Davies, 
Rondi and Sembenelli (2001) proposed a matrix of the market shares of the 
main European industrial firms according to two criteria: the sector to 
which they belong and their national origins. Thanks to this matrix, it is 
possible to follow the evolution of the degree of diversification or special-
ization, of the geographical location and the level of multinationalization 
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in European industry. This matrix helps to understand some aspects of 
European structural change and to elaborate the foundations of an indus-
trial policy which is entirely different from a competition policy, based 
on coordination at the European level. In a close analytical framework, 
Cantwell and Iammarino (2001) show how, in an economy submitted to 
a quick process of globalization and economic integration (as in Europe), 
regions create geographical connections with other territories either in 
the same country or in another European country utilizing multinational 
firms efforts towards technological change. Here again, national coun-
tries and the European Commission are necessarily interested in the for-
mation of clusters and networks and can act on productive organization to 
reinforce emerging connections with the help of adequate industrial pol-
icies as “the smart specialisation strategy” illustrates, in which regional 
dimension is a part of European policy (especially to prevent duplications 
in clusters). Finally, Malerba, Nelson, Orsenigo and Winter (2001) focused 
on the specific case of increasing returns industries as, for example, those 
which are impacted by digital technologies. In this context, competition 
is obviously analysed through the definition of anti-trust policies but also 
the definition of a program of subsidies allowing the development of new 
forms of technological organization.
All these examples focus on different aspects of economic structural 
change as such (technological, geographical). In this context, industrial 
policies cease to be first competition policies and can contribute to the re-
orientation of technological change and of its forms, and a policy of coor-
dination across different regions at the European level. Moreover they 
are much more eclectic trying to specify industrial policies taking into 
account institutional devices, industrial sectors, contexts or the nature of 
agents.
5. CONCLUSION
Two major conclusions can be drawn from our contribution.
First, it is clear that industrial policy is a complex reality which expresses 
economic observations, political considerations and analytical interpre-
tations. It is not surprising therefore that various points of view are 
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defended to understand it, that they do not coincide and form a matter of 
debate. These points of view also evolved with time but often persisted and 
overlapped. It is not therefore easy to untangle the strings of arguments 
and discussions in the matter of industrial economics and policy to-day.
Second, our contribution showed a surprising evolution in time of the 
notion of industrial policy. The starting-point of this evolution was the 
beginning of the 1980s when most of economists and policy-makers tended 
to discard industrial policy and to insist on competition policy. The pre-
sent situation shows that the central issue of industrial policy has become 
to-day the understanding of how public authorities can help our econo-
mies to favour a form of economic structural change which can help the 
world economy, the various countries and smaller and local areas to gen-
erate growth, innovation and employment. The evolution we tried to point 
out is striking because it gives the impression that reality obliged econ-
omists to adapt their analytical contributions, whichever these where 
a priori. In matter of economic policy, contributors are thus condemned to 
understand ex post instead of explaining and foreseeing ex ante. The exam-
ples of the concepts of pure competition and economic structural change 
are significant from this point of view. The developments devoted to both 
of them show that the progressive explanatory weakening of the former 
and the sudden rise of the latter were as much the result of economic 
change in the real world as the conclusion of analytical debates between 
different economic approaches or schools of thought.
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